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Space is an increasingly congested, contested and competitive environment. At the same 
time, the Marine Corps is becoming increasingly reliant on the capabilities space-based 
assets provide. This includes each of the space force enhancement capabilities, but 
particularly satellite-based voice and data communication; position, navigation, and 
timing information; and battlefield intelligence. Space capabilities are vulnerable to both 
space-based and terrestrial-based countermeasures. This study was conducted to 
determine the extent to which the Marine Corps educates and trains warfighters to 
operate in a battlefield where space-centric enabling capabilities are degraded or denied. 
The study surveyed the systems and capabilities on which the Marine Corps relies in 
order to enhance its execution of the highly dynamic range of military operations as well 
as the threats to those systems and capabilities. Furthermore, the study examined to what 
levels and extent related training and education should take place, and which venues 
would best host that training. Based on the analysis, this thesis recommends leveraging 
internal Marine Corps expertise, increasing integration of space-related education and 
training into schoolhouse curricula and training exercises, and leveraging joint space 
expertise and resources to enhance Marine Corps readiness to excel in a contested space 
operational environment.  
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Space has become a critical component to the military’s strategic, operational, and 
tactical planning and execution. This warfighting domain is an increasingly congested, 
contested, and competitive environment [1]. Not only are there threats from near-peer 
adversaries, but critical force enhancement capabilities provided by space-centric 
capabilities can be interfered with or blocked with relatively inexpensive and easy-to-
access technology and equipment. This means that counter space capabilities are 
becoming more available to a broader group of less developed nations, terrorists, and 
criminal organizations. This degradation or denial can have significant negative impacts 
on operational timelines, lines of communication, and intelligence collection. 
The Marine Corps relentlessly employs maneuver warfare elements and combined 
arms in its operational planning and execution. The advantage in these operations is 
drawn from a Marine Air Ground Task Force’s (MAGTF’s) superior capabilities in 
command and control, communications, intelligence, and precision targeting. These 
capabilities are increasingly enabled and enhanced by space-based assets and capabilities.  
Air Force Colonel John Boyd developed a well-regarded theory about decision-
making processes that has been applied to how decisions are made for combat operations. 
It is popularly referred to as the “OODA Loop” [2]. In summary, the concept applied to 
maneuver warfare asserts that a commander who can observe, orient, decide, and then act 
(OODA) faster than an adversary will ultimately win in a contest of arms. Space-centric 
capabilities enable the United States to sustain a faster and more reliable OODA loop 
than its adversaries. Degradation or denial of those assets and capabilities slows this 
decision cycle by eliminating critical enhancements to the warfighting functions and 
introducing increased levels of uncertainty.   
It is important to emphasize that the loss or degradation of these capabilities will 
not necessarily stop the Marine Corps’ ability to operate. The Marine Corps has a long 
and undisputed history of fighting and overcoming adversaries regardless of conditions 
and availability of resources. However, given the level to which space-enabled 
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capabilities have been integrated into the MAGTF planning and operational construct, 
significant interference, degradation, or denial of these capabilities will severely impact 
MAGTF operations across all warfighting functions. This will effectively slow the 
MAGTFs OODA Loop and shrink the gap between friendly and enemy capabilities as 
well as timeliness and effectiveness in planning and executing operations.   
The keys to maintaining the advantage are to: educate commanders, staffs, and 
operators on the threats and implications to operations; develop valid tactics, techniques, 
and procedures (TTPs) to counter those threats; and then to exercise and enhance this 
knowledge and these skills in unit drills, training evolutions, and exercises. 
This study evaluates the extent to which the Marine Corps is reliant on these 
enabling space-based capabilities, the threats to those capabilities, and the scope and 
amount of training that is currently available to the operating forces.  Based on this 
analysis, recommendations are made on how education and training can be improved and 
expanded in order to make commanders, staffs, and the operators at the point of friction 
capable of effective operations, even in the face of degraded or denied space capabilities.    
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II. MARINE CORPS RELIANCE ON SPACE 
The Marine Corps relies heavily on multiple critical operational and tactical 
capabilities provided by space-centric assets. These capabilities are doctrinally referred to 
as space force enhancements and include satellite communications (SATCOM); position, 
navigation, and timing (PNT); intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); 
missile warning and attack assessment; and environmental monitoring [3]. Figures 1–5 
are examples of space systems on orbit that are enabling each of the respective space 
force enhancements.  
A. SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS  
 
 Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) Narrowband Figure 1. 
Communications Satellite, from [4]. 
SATCOM links permit the MAGTF to expand its area of influence and scope of 
operations by facilitating communication with elements operating beyond line-of-sight 
range. This capability provides access to global information and intelligence networks, 
ship-to-shore communication, and connectivity between elements in austere areas where 
there is limited or no other communication infrastructure available. These factors are 
critical to the expeditionary nature of MAGTF operations and core capabilities. With 
 4 
these lines of communication, MAGTFs can operate in a much more distributed manner 
and are able to more reliably sustain effective command and control during operations 
over greater distances with fewer forces.  
B. POSITION, NAVIGATION, AND TIMING 
 
 Global Positioning System (GPS) Block IIR-M Satellite, from [5]. Figure 2. 
Space-based position, navigation, and timing (PNT) assets provide highly 
accurate and reliable position information, navigation solutions, and critical timing 
synchronization that enable more effective planning, training, and execution of MAGTF 
operations. The main PNT system used by U.S. military forces is the Global Positioning 
System (GPS) operated by the U.S. Air Force. Although the service is publically 
available, it has military-specific capabilities. Position information is critical for friendly 
force tracking (FFT) and targeting. PNT capabilities also facilitate reliable and efficient 
navigation of maneuvering units and provide critical guidance to precision munitions. 
This enables prosecution of targets from greater stand-off distances with greater precision 
and accuracy, which reduces collateral damage and eases logistical strains, as fewer 
warheads are required. The precise timing facilitates secure communications via 
frequency hopping and other cryptologic and communication systems requiring precise 
synchronization. Data networks rely on precise timing signals provided by PNT systems 
to synch network traffic, manage data flow, and maintain integrity. This is increasingly 
vital as military forces are becoming ever more reliant on distributed networks. 
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C. INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE 
 
 U.S. Air Force Operationally Responsive Space One (ORS-1) Figure 3. 
Imaging Satellite, from [6]. 
Space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) provides 
capabilities that uniquely augment air and ground-based ISR assets. The high ground of 
space affords the ability to overcome line-of-sight (LOS) restrictions experienced by 
terrestrial collection assets, as well as opening access to virtually the entire globe. With 
the right sensors, space-based collection assets can provide day or night, all-weather, 
deep reconnaissance of otherwise denied areas. Territorial airspace claims do not extend 
into space and therefore spacecraft have unique access to observe and collect intelligence 
on targets or points of interest otherwise inaccessible to airborne platforms due to 
overflight restrictions.  
Space systems in low-earth orbit (LEO, approximately 100 miles to 1,200 miles in 
altitude) offer the best resolution for imagery and other collection, but cannot offer 
persistent coverage over a target due to the physical constraints of the orbits. If positioned 
in higher orbits, like geosynchronous orbits (GEO, 22,236 miles in altitude), space 
systems can provide persistent coverage to as much as a third of the surface of the earth; 
however, this altitude generally limits resolution compared to the capabilities of lower 
orbiting satellites.  
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It would not be uncommon for the best or only early surveillance or 
reconnaissance available to be from a space-based asset, specifically in the event of an 
amphibious forced entry operation or deep strike. With a thorough understanding of the 
available capabilities, MAGTF intelligence officers can integrate the products these 
assets provide into their collection plans and leverage these capabilities to better inform 
the commander and staff.  
D. MISSILE WARNING AND ATTACK ASSESSMENT 
 
 Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) Geosynchronous (GEO) Figure 4. 
Satellite, from [7].   
Short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic and cruise missile technology is 
becoming more prevalent and there is a consequent significant increase in the likelihood 
that MAGTF will be exposed to these threats. Early detection, characterization, and threat 
warning, if these weapons are employed, are key aspects to ensuring the MAGTF will be 
able to mitigate the threat and defend itself in a timely manner. Robust space-based 
missile warning capabilities, working in conjunction with terrestrially-based systems, 
enable critical and timely detection and subsequent notification. Although the 
organizations that operate the systems and disseminate the notifications are generally 
joint in nature and not directly controlled by the Marine Corps, their capabilities can be 
leveraged by MAGTF commands as long as the lines of communication and coordination 
have been established. These lines of communication can be established and preserved 
even in an expeditionary environment, but the notification channels must be consistently 
monitored to ensure connectivity is maintained.  
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E. ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING 
 
 Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) Block 5D2 Figure 5. 
Satellite, from [8]. 
Terrestrial weather conditions such as severe storms or unfavorable surface 
conditions on land or at sea can have significant impacts on military operations. Space-
based environmental monitoring systems sensors can identify and characterize 
environmental phenomena on land, in the air, at sea and in space that can impact military 
planning and operations. In addition to terrestrial weather, environmental monitoring 
systems can aid in landing zone (LZ) or beach evaluation and vegetation characterization, 
and can be used to monitor forest fires, volcano activity, and even air quality. Another 
aspect of environmental monitoring is forecasting and detecting solar activity. This 
activity can have significant negative effects to ultra-high frequency (UHF) 
communication. Extremely high frequency (EHF) communications are sensitive to 
moisture in the air and can also be affected by dense jungle canopy. Understanding the 
terrestrial and space weather conditions, forecasts, and possible implications to operations 
can help MAGTF commanders and staffs avoid adverse conditions, synch operational 
plans and considerations with real world conditions, and allow for the exploitation of 
these conditions to enhance operations.  
 8 
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III. SPACE FORCE ENHANCEMENT AND THE SIX 
WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS 
Space force enhancements play critical enabling roles in each of the warfighting 
functions. The modern MAGTF is structured and trained to operate across the spectrum 
of conflict with these space-enabled capabilities. Understanding how space force 
enhancements are implemented in support of the warfighting functions is critical to 
understanding how loss or degradation of the applicable capabilities will affect 
warfighting function capabilities.  Table 1 shows how each of the elements of space force 
enhancement individually relate to the six warfighting functions.  
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 Command and Control (1)
Space Force Enhancements provide a commander with expanded communication 
and situational awareness capabilities beyond those provided by terrestrial systems. 
Space-based ISR can provide invaluable insight and access to denied areas. SATCOM 
facilitates communication with widely distributed and mobile forces. Space-based PNT 
and SATCOM capabilities also permit near-real-time and accurate tracking of friendly 
forces in order to prevent fratricide. PNT provides for accurate synchronization of 
encrypted communication systems allowing options for secure communication channels. 
Space-based environmental monitoring systems inform the commander on not only 
terrestrial weather considerations, but also space weather that may affect terrestrial and 
space-based communication signals.  
 Maneuver (2)
As previously mentioned, SATCOM provides the critical communication links 
that provide the commander greater options in maneuvering widely distributed forces. 
PNT enables those forces to rapidly, accurately, and reliably navigate in unfamiliar 
terrain and in areas where navigation is particularly challenging such as featureless 
desert, dense jungle, or open water. Environmental monitoring provides maneuvering 
forces an idea of surface conditions they can expect that will affect route selection and 
maneuverability. Also, weather forecasting affects movements on the sea from ship-to-
shore as well as ability to maneuver on land.   
 Fires (3)
SATCOM expands options for command and control of fires with distributed 
forces, both from higher echelons as well as from troops on the ground. PNT capabilities 
expand the options in the use of GPS-guided precision guided munitions (PGMs) for 
increased accuracy, operability in adverse weather that degrades other forms of precision 
guidance (laser, infrared seekers, etc.), and collateral damage reduction, as well as 
reducing the number of munitions required to achieve the desired effects on a target. 
More precise synchronization of fires is also enabled by PNT. Space-based ISR systems 
can provide accurate battle damage assessment (BDA) in areas denied to other platforms. 
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Environmental monitoring systems aid in planning weapon target pairing by enabling 
consideration of the effects of weather and surface conditions at a target.   
 Intelligence (4)
There are numerous space-based imagery intelligence (IMINT) and signals 
intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities that can provide critical information that could not be 
gathered in any other manner. Updated intelligence products can be requested, received, 
and disseminated via SATCOM voice and data links to isolated and austere operating 
environments. Reliable positioning enables development of target lists and determination 
of friendly and enemy positions, as well as preparing for and executing contingencies like 
tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (TRAP). The commander can also exploit ISR 
and communication capabilities provided by SATCOM enabled unmanned aerial systems 
(UASs). These systems are terrestrially based, but SATCOM links enable a farther reach.  
 Logistics (5)
Even logistic lines are aided by space-based capabilities. PNT permits near real-
time tracking of supply locations and shipments and SATCOM provides for more 
responsive supply movements. SATCOM allows otherwise isolated units to reach back 
with logistical requests or concerns and also allows for shipments to possibly be 
redirected in-transit if needs or requests change.  
 Force Protection (6)
Satellite missile warning systems provide early warning of missile attacks and 
SATCOM facilitates dissemination of those warning messages all the way down to the 
tactical level of command, as long as those lines of communication have been 
established. Also PNT systems and associated FFT systems provide the ability to more 
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IV. THREATS TO SPACE-BASED CAPABILITIES 
Areas of space force enhancement are contested and the capabilities are 
threatened. There are threats to both the space systems and the capabilities they deliver. 
The enabling capabilities provided to the warfighter by space assets actually come from 
an integrated network of systems. This network can be broken down into three segments: 
the ground segment, the space segment, and the communication link segment. Each 
segment has unique threats to its ability to execute its particular mission set.  
A. GROUND SEGMENT 
The ground segment of the space systems network includes terrestrially based 
terminals, both mobile and fixed, antennas, processing facilities, and terrestrial 
communication links, whether it is cable, fiber optic, or another method connecting these 
facilities.  
There are two main threats to the ground segment of the space network: kinetic 
attacks and cyberattacks. Kinetic threats include easily imaginable acts as sabotage or an 
air or ground attack that targets buildings, hardware, antennas, or fiber optic lines of 
communication. Figure 6 shows how catastrophic an attack on a ground station in 
wartime can be. Cyber threats can affect both hardware and software and can be used to 
disrupt operations or damage equipment. 
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 Kuwaiti Satellite Antenna Site Destroyed during 1990 Iraqi Figure 6. 
Invasion, from [11]. 
B. SPACE SEGMENT 
The space segment consists of on-orbit assets. These are the spacecraft busses and 
payloads that are generally built to last long periods of time in an inhospitable 
environment and are often the most expensive component of the network. These systems 
must by nature be highly reliable and resilient because at the current state of technology, 
there are few if any practical options or means to repair, refuel, or refit a satellite on orbit 
if the system or a component thereof fails or is damaged. 
There are multiple threats to the space segment of the network. These include 
kinetic energy weapons, directed energy weapons, and nuclear effects. In addition to 
these threats originating from adversarial entities, there are threats to the spacecraft that 
do not come from enemy action. Space debris and the natural space environment present 
hazards that must be planned for and mitigated. Figure 7 shows examples of both kinetic 
and directed energy capabilities that have been observed.  
One of the reasons space systems can be so susceptible to offensive attack is due 
to the nature of the predetermined orbits which makes their paths predictable which, in 
turn, makes them relatively easy to characterize and track.  
 15 
  
 Depiction of Chinese ASAT Capabilities, from [12]. Figure 7. 
 Kinetic Energy Weapons (1)
These hard kill weapons are intended to destroy or render a target satellite 
inoperable. They are broken down into low-altitude, direct-ascent interceptors; low- and 
high-altitude, short-duration orbital interceptors; and Long-Duration Orbital Interceptors 
[13]. The target altitudes and time-of-flight characteristics of these anti-satellite (ASAT) 
weapons are relatively self-explanatory. The long-duration orbital interceptors are 
generally intended to be launched and positioned well before a target is even identified 
and then are activated in the event a target has been selected and becomes targetable.  
On 11 January 2007, China launched its first successful direct-ascent ASAT 
weapon. They launched a land-based, medium-range ballistic missile targeted at a 
defunct Chinese weather satellite. Although both the United States and Russia had 
conducted similar successful tests in the past, this was the first test for a non-Cold War 
contender and was widely seen as highly provocative [14]. On 14 February 2008, the 
United States launched an SM-3 at a defunct U.S. reconnaissance satellite [15]. Although 
the stated purpose was to destroy the highly toxic hydrazine fuel on board to mitigate 
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health risks if any of the material survived re-entry, it demonstrated that the United States 
maintains the same ASAT capability.  
 Directed Energy Weapons (2)
Directed Energy Weapons are generally intended to overwhelm and incapacitate 
or destroy sensors and subsystems, but can cause greater irreversible damage given 
enough power. Laser and radio frequency (RF) weapons can target SATCOM, IMINT, 
SIGINT, or other ISR assets. Particle beam weapons all fall into this category, as well.  
The effects of directed energy weapons against imagery systems can be divided in 
to the categories of “dazzling” and “blinding.” Dazzling implies temporary interference 
with a system’s ability to image, whereas blinding generally refers to permanent damage 
to a sensor; permanent damage is usually the result of a much higher power energy beam 
than a beam intended to dazzle [13]. Even if only temporary, this capability negates the 
ability to image for at least a period of time and that might be just enough for an enemy 
to conceal a critical activity. It was reported that China has demonstrated the ability to at 
least dazzle an on-orbit system and has done so against U.S. ISR assets in the past [16].  
 Nuclear Effects (3)
All segments of a space system are vulnerable to a high altitude or space-based 
nuclear detonation and its effects. These effects include damage due to blast and shock, 
thermal radiation, transient nuclear radiation, and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) [17]. 
Historical tests of nuclear detonation effects in space proved that high energy radiation 
from a nuclear blast can have disastrous effects on spacecraft and communication links. 
On July 9, 1962, The United States tested a nuclear weapon at high altitude over the 
Pacific Ocean. The test was called Starfish Prime and detonated a warhead on a Thor 
missile 400 km (240 miles) above the surface. The blast could be seen from Hawaii over 
800 miles away and the resulting EMP knocked out streetlights, power grids, and 
telephone networks across the Hawaiian Islands [18]. The highly energized electrons 
from such a blast stay in orbit for extended periods of time and can cause severe damage 
if they come into contact with spacecraft electronics. Starfish Prime was confirmed to 
have damaged at least six satellites, all of which eventually failed as a result of blast 
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effects, and there were other satellite failures that could possibly have been linked to the 
blast as well [19].  
 Space Debris (4)
There are over 20,000 pieces of debris the size of a softball or greater that are 
currently able to be tracked in orbit and there are an estimated 500,000 pieces the size of 
a marble or larger [20]. The “big sky, little plane” concept is becoming a thing of the 
past. Debris from the 2007 Chinese ASAT missile test on the defunct satellite added 
thousands of pieces to the collection [21]; and in 2009 an Iridium communication satellite 
and a Russian Cosmos satellite collided and spread into over 1,000 pieces of debris 10 cm 
or larger and thousands more smaller fragments [22]. Figure 8. shows the tracked debris 
pattern distribution expansion from that collision over time. 
 
 Debris Spread from the Iridium-Cosmos Collision over Time, Figure 8. 
from [23].  
There is everything from spent upper stages of rockets and dead satellites to 
gloves, tools, and even dust and paint flecks that can still cause serious damage at orbital 
velocities. Figure 9. shows the results of a half-inch wide impactor after it struck a 7-
inch-thick block of aluminum at 15,200 mph (6.8 m/s). 
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 Results of a Half-Inch-Wide Impactor Striking a 7-inch-thick Figure 9. 
Aluminum Block at 15,200 mph (6.8 km/s), from [23].  
 Space Environment (5)
The space environment is a naturally hostile and unforgiving setting. There are a 
number of phenomena that threaten the ability of a space system to operate that must be 
taken into consideration primarily in the design process. These phenomena are often 
referred to as space weather and include such factors as atmospheric drag, solar radiation, 
cosmic radiation, and the highly dynamic thermal environment to name a few. These 
threats are generally planned for during the design phase of a space system. A spacecraft 
is generally hardened to endure the expected radiation environment for the duration of its 
life expectancy. It is important to note that some spacecraft hardening against space 
environment threats can also benefit the system in the event of a hostile attack.  
C. COMMUNICATION LINK SEGMENT 
A space system is not useful if it cannot communicate data collected, relay 
information, whether voice or data, or if the signal is interfered with or manipulated to 
cause false or corrupted data to be transmitted or received. This threat is not restricted to 
SATCOM; communication signals can conceivably be affected between ISR assets and 
the ground stations receiving collected data, and adversaries can interfere with SIGINT 
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and radar collection, as well as any telemetry, tracking, and control (TT&C) link between 
a satellite and its controlling ground station.  
 Jamming 1.
The target of jamming is to interfere with the reception of a communication 
signal. It is important to note that any transmitter can generally be employed as a jammer 
which offers insight as to why jamming technology and techniques have proliferated so 
much around the world.  
There are hundreds of communications satellites and each satellite can host 
dozens to hundreds of signals. Signal transmissions are assigned to different satellites, 
center frequencies, polarizations, and bandwidths in order to avoid interference [24]. 
When signals overlap or conflict in any of these areas, it creates interference—jamming 
is intentional interference. 
A jammer needs three things to be effective. First, the jammer must have 
sufficient power to disrupt reception. Second, the jammer must match the frequency of 
the targeted signal. Third, the jammer must have access to the receiver. A jammer does 
not affect the transmission of a signal; it must have access to the signal path and will 
affect reception [24].  
In order to close a communications link, the transmitted signal must achieve a 
sufficient signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), or bit error rate to noise spectral density (Eb/No) for 
digital communications. The SNR and Eb/No is measured at the receiver and is a function 
of the power, modulation scheme, data rate, and error correction methods like forward 
error correction (FEC). Generally, the received signal must be stronger than the 
background noise, or the noise floor, in order for the signal to be received and effectively 
interpreted. Figures 10 and 11 depict examples of a signal strong enough to close a link 
and an underpowered signal that will not be able to close a link, respectively.   
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 Signal with Enough Power to be Detected above the Noise Floor, Figure 10. 
from [24]. 
 
 An Underpowered Signal Hidden below the Noise Floor, from [24]. Figure 11. 
A jamming signal essentially increases the noise floor over the targeted 
frequency. The jamming signal decreases the SNR to the point that the signal is lost or 
suffers from significant errors (see Figure 12). 
 
 An Example of a Jammed Signal, from [24]. Figure 12. 
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There are three main types of jamming: barrage jamming, spot jamming, and 
hopping or swept jamming. Jamming can also be targeted at either a terrestrial receiver, 
called downlink jamming, or at an on-orbit receiver, called uplink jamming. 
Barrage jamming, also known as “wideband jamming,” is characterized by a 
signal that is transmitted across a broad range of the electromagnetic spectrum (see 
Figure 13). The intention is to jam multiple signals using a wideband waveform. This 
method is simple and effective, but because the power is spread across a range of 
frequencies, more power is required to be able to affect the full spectrum. This can be 
wasteful of jammer power if there are only a few actual target signals within that 
spectrum. 
 
 Barrage Jamming, from [24]. Figure 13. 
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Spot jamming, or “narrowband jamming,” targets a specific portion or frequency 
of the spectrum (see Figure 14). The advantage to spot jamming is the power can be 
focused on a specific band allowing a stronger influence over that targeted frequency. A 
spot jammer can conduct multiple spot jamming attacks as long as there are the requisite 
additional signal generators and power available. 
 
 Spot Jamming, from [24]. Figure 14. 
Hopped/Swept Jamming uses a narrowband waveform to hop or sweep across 
multiple target signals. This is a simpler form of jamming that allows a jammer to 
concentrate power and affect more target frequencies (see Figure 15). However, the 
duration of impact on each of the target signals will be diminished and therefore will be 
less effective than a continuous jammer. 
 
 Hopped or Swept Jamming, from [24]. Figure 15. 
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Uplink Jamming is when the interfering signal is targeted at the satellite receivers 
(see Figure 16). It is the easiest and most common type of jamming because the satellite 
is generally exposed and the antennas are easily accessed because they are pointed at the 
surface of the earth. The jammer needs only to be in the uplink footprint regardless of 
where the targeted ground receivers are. This form of jamming will generally be targeted 
at SATCOM and TT&C signals.  
 
 Examples of Uplink and Downlink Jamming, from [25]. Figure 16. 
Downlink Jamming targets the terrestrial receivers (see Figure 16). This is 
generally more difficult because the location of the receiver must be known and jammer 
must be within line of sight of the receiving antennas signal reception pattern in order to 
affect the incoming signal. This method of jamming lends itself to airborne jammers. 
However, all antennas have side lobes in addition to the main signal lobe; the size and 
extent of the lobes are a function of the antenna design and frequency. Although it will 
require more power from a jammer, if a jammer can get access to one of the side-lobes, 
the jammer can have the same effect on the receiver as if it had access to the main lobe. 
This opens the door for ground-based jammers that would otherwise not have access to a 
signal if an antenna was pointed to an overhead space asset. This form of jamming will 
generally be targeted at PNT and SATCOM signals. 
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 Spoofing 2.
Spoofing is the most insidious threat and also the most difficult to accomplish. 
The intent is not to block an incoming signal, but to fool a receiving antenna into 
believing an erroneous signal is legitimate (see Figure 17). In the realm of PNT, this 
could include retransmission of a legitimate signal from another location to confuse a 
receiver or steadily feeding a signal that causes the receiver to lead the system to a 
specific alternate route. In all forms, this is a relatively more difficult effect because the 
exact nature of the transmitted signal must be known and replicated by the spoofing 
system. Spoofing signals will most likely be targeted at PNT, but SATCOM and TT&C 
links can also conceivably be spoofed as well. 
 
 Effects of Spoofing on Navigation Systems, from [26]. Figure 17. 
 Direct versus Indirect Effects 3.
Threats can have both direct effects and indirect effects. Jamming or spoofing of 
PNT receivers directly affects the ability to navigate. However, GPS signals are also 
heavily used in communications for synchronization of transmission and reception 
equipment as well as in signal encryption. 
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V. MARINE CORPS TACTICAL MITIGATION CAPABILITES  
The Air Force, Army, and to the extent of UHF SATCOM, the Navy have direct 
impact on the full spectrum of SFE capabilities as they are the operators of the majority 
of spacecraft. While the Marine Corps does not own, operate, or manage any space 
systems, and therefore cannot directly influence their operation, Marines do have the 
ability to directly apply mitigation tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to 
overcome the effects of degradation or denial, specifically in the arenas of SATCOM and 
PNT. Marines can still integrate considerations for degradation of other SFE areas, but 
this will generally be a product of the planning process and will take place at higher 
levels of command.  
A. SATCOM 
 Fundamentals of SATCOM 1.
In order to better understand the threats to both civilian and military satellite 
communication systems, it is important to understand some of the fundamental details 
about the SATCOM systems and infrastructure in use. These include the frequency bands 
utilized, the advantages and disadvantages to each of these bands, and an operational 
design technique known as spot beams. 
a. Frequency Bands 
There are three main bands in the electromagnetic spectrum that are designated by 
the United Nations’ International Telecommunication Union (ITU) that are used for 
satellite communications systems, namely ultra-high frequency (UHF, 300MHz to 3 
GHz), super high frequency (SHF, 3 GHz to 30 GHz), and extremely high frequency 
(EHF, 30 GHz to 300 GHz). Each of these bands has applications and advantages and 
disadvantages in their use (see Figure 18 and Table 2). 
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 Satellite Communication Frequency Bands, from [26].  Figure 18. 
 UHF (1)
UHF Frequencies offer a number of advantages to the user. First, the UHF 
frequencies are minimally affected by terrestrial weather and are able to penetrate dense 
foliage allowing for communication even in triple canopy jungle. UHF terminals allow 
for a highly mobile user community due to terminals being relatively small and 
inexpensive as well as the ability to use omnidirectional antennas. The UHF spectrum is 
also widely used around the world allowing for easier interoperability in joint and 
combined operations.  
Disadvantages to the UHF spectrum include a relatively limited number of 
channels with limited throughput as compared to other bands. With many of the legacy 
communication systems, there is limited anti-jam capability due to the systems being 
transponder-based (also known as “bent pipe”). This means there is no processing done 
and the signal is retransmitted exactly as it was received, therefor any signal interference 
between the terrestrial transmitter and the satellite receiver will be retransmitted to the 
terrestrial receiver. UHF signals in space are susceptible to scintillation which is a 
function of increased solar activity, other space weather, or a nuclear detonation. Finally, 
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UHF bands are also susceptible to unintentional interference due to the ubiquity of its use 
around the world.  
 SHF (2)
These higher frequency bands offer the advantages of greater bandwidth and 
throughput capacity than UHF signals. This allows for greater use of video 
teleconferencing (VTC) for planning and briefing, for sensor-to-shooter capabilities and 
imagery dissemination, as well as near-real-time common operational picture (COP) 
updates permitting greater situational awareness. These systems also allow for greater 
protection than UHF systems by incorporating increased anti-jam capabilities as well as 
low probability of detection (LPD) and low probability of interception (LPI) techniques. 
These signals are also less susceptible to scintillation than UHF frequencies. 
However, SHF signals are more susceptible to atmospheric attenuation, terrestrial 
weather, and foliage blockage. Also, SHF frequency bands are becoming more crowed as 
commercial SATCOM systems proliferate. 
 EHF (3)
EHF frequencies have the greatest bandwidth of the three, allowing for the 
greatest throughput and/or greatest level of protection. The small beams and the increased 
capability for spread spectrum modulation schemes enhance the LPI and LPD 
characteristics. There are also currently fewer users of the EHF spectrum allowing for 
more freedom in spectrum use. Another significant benefit is EHF frequencies experience 
little to no effects due to scintillation. 
On the down side, EHF signals suffer significantly from atmospheric attenuation 
and weather in the form of clouds and rain severely degrade the ability to communicate. 
These systems also have higher power requirements and are more complex and expensive 
than UHF and SHF systems. The small beams result in less coverage over the ground, 
limiting the number users that can take advantage of a spot beam. 
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Table 2.   SATCOM Frequency Utilization Trade-offs, from [27]. 
b. Spot Beams 
A beam from a SATCOM system is the cone in which a communication signal is 
focused and terminates in what is called a footprint on the surface of the earth. Early 
communications satellite antennas were designed with hemispherical, or earth-coverage, 
beams. As frequencies have increased and modulation schemes and other advanced 
communication technologies have been developed, satellites have progressively been 
designed to incorporate spot beams (see Figure 19). Spot beams are more focused and the 
footprints can be shaped to meet operator and user requirements [27].  
Spot beams are very useful to improve LPI/LPD characteristics and enable 
advanced frequency re-use and digital modulation schemes. By being able to target 
smaller areas or specific receivers on the ground, the risk of third-party interception or 
interference is reduced, the same frequencies can be used by different users in closer 




 Examples of Hemispherical Beams versus Spot Beams, after [28]. Figure 19. 
c. Military SATCOM Systems 
There are dedicated military satellite communication systems providing service in 
each of the three spectral bands.  
There are three systems on orbit providing communication links in the UHF band; 
two legacy systems, Fleet Satellite Communication System (FLTSATCOM) and UHF 
Follow-on (UFO), and the new constellation being established, the Mobile User 
Objective System (MUOS). The U.S. Navy runs the bus and payload operations for each 
of these systems. 
Similarly, there is a legacy system and the current program of record on orbit 
providing wideband SHF service to the Department of Defense (DOD). The Defense 
Satellite Communication System (DSCS) is the legacy system and Wideband Global 
SATCOM (WGS) is the current program of record; the U.S. Army conducts payload 
operations and control and the U.S. Air Force runs the bus operations. 
In the EHF band, Military Strategic and Tactical Relay (MILSTAR) is the legacy 
system still operating on orbit, and Advanced EHF (AEHF) is the next generation system 
in operation. Both systems are run by the U.S. Air Force.  
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d. Civilian SATCOM Systems 
Commercial SATCOM is a critical component to the DOD SATCOM 
infrastructure. Commercial services are often divided into Fixed Satellite Service (FSS), 
Mobile Satellite Service (MSS), and UHF services [29]. Figure 20. shows the expansion 
of COMSATCOM usage expressed in the form of expenditures between 2001 and 2010. 
 
 Total DOD FSS and MSS COMSATCOM Annual Expenditures, Figure 20. 
from [29]. 
In 2013, commercial SATCOM supported an estimated 40% of DOD SATCOM 
needs, and was forecasted to grow to 68% over the next decade [30]. The FY15 
Presidential Budget contains provisions for $4.5 billion in support of government 
SATCOM systems. The cost of commercial satellite services is expected to reach $3 to 
$5 billion in the next 15 years [31]. The GAO reported: 
The Department of Defense (DOD) continues to rely on commercial 
satellite communications to plan and support operations. DOD use of 
commercial satellite bandwidth has increased over the past few years, 
making the department the largest single customer of commercial satellite 
bandwidth. [32] 
Several major satellite communication providers are contracted to provide these 
services across each of the UHF, SHF, and EHF frequency spectrums. These companies 
include Inmarsat, ViaSat, Iridium, and Intelsat, among others.  
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 DOD SATCOM Use 2.
SATCOM use in the DOD is expanding at an accelerating pace. Figure 21. shows 
how DOD capacity and usage has expanded from the advent of SATCOM capability.  
 
 Historical Expansion of DOD SATCOM Use, from [33]. Figure 21. 
Since Operation DESERT STORM through the initiation of Operation IRAQI 
FREEDOM in 2003, the military’s bandwidth expanded from 100Mbps to approximately 
4Gbps. In 2012, one Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) required 
approximately 500 Mbps to conduct its mission; that is five times the bandwidth 
requirement for the entire U.S. military in DESERT STORM [34]. 
 Bandwidth demand has continued to increase as time has progressed and 
operational tempo has continued to increase, even as major combat operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have wound down. This demand shows no sign of decreasing (see Figure 
22). Whether satisfied by DOD systems or commercial SATCOM systems, SATCOM 
capabilities remain a critical enabling capability, even in the face of very real threats to 
the infrastructure.  
 32 
 
 U.S. Military Bandwidth Demands from Desert Storm to Iraqi Figure 22. 
Freedom, from [33]. 
 Mitigating Threats to SATCOM 3.
An in-depth exploration of the full range of mitigation capabilities and TTPs is 
beyond the scope of this research, but there are a number of basic considerations that 
should be highlighted and taken into account when dealing with issues related to 
degraded or denied SATCOM links.  
Prior to a mission, planning considerations can be made to reduce vulnerability to 
threats and to make mitigation implementation smoother. First, make terrestrial lines of 
communication the primary means of communications to the maximum extent possible. 
Long distance high frequency (HF) communications are still viable means of 
communication, even if it has relatively limited bandwidth and quality. Other 
considerations include having robust secondary and tertiary communication plans and 
ensuring degradation mitigation steps and alternate communication plans are addressed in 
rehearsals and exercises.  
Once in the execution phase, the first necessary step to effectively overcoming 
interference is recognizing indications of jamming or other interference and accurately 
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characterizing the nature of the interfering signal. Interference can originate from 
malfunctioning equipment, overpowered or mistuned friendly communications 
equipment, interfering effects from space or terrestrial weather or from some other 
naturally occurring source, or the interference may originate from a malicious source. 
Something as simple as an oscilloscope can help an operator detect the presence of a 
jamming signal. For example, knowing the character of the intended signal as represented 
on an oscilloscope, an interfering signal can be observed and this can offer clues as to the 
nature of the interfering signal.  
 
 Example of Oscilloscope Readout with Interference, after [24]. Figure 23. 
Knowing indications of each and methods to rapidly characterize the sources will 
enable the communicator to resolve the interference or make the necessary adjustments to 
mitigate the effects on the operations at hand. These mitigation steps can include 
switching to alternate frequencies or entirely different spectrum bands, depending on the 
nature of the interference. Transitioning to these alternate communication channels would 
be a function of the pre-mission planning process. 
This interference resolution will often involve interaction and coordination with 
external agencies. Elevating the reports of interference to higher coordinating levels of 
command can assist in resolution by identifying if the interference is from an adjacent 
friendly unit, in which case the command can direct appropriate signal adjustments to 
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resolve the interference. Knowing the proper method and format of reporting can assist 
higher commands in effectively bringing to bear other capabilities in the areas of 
characterization, geolocation, and resolution, including joint and national technical 
means. One of the fundamental means of reporting is the Joint Spectrum Interference 
Resolution (JSIR) process.1  
Understanding the threats to communications links is also a vital part of the 
planning process. Both natural and man-made threats must be taken into account as plans 
are under development. For example, if adverse space weather is forecast during a 
planned operation that would degrade critical UHF voice or data communication links, 
the operational timeline can be adjusted or more robust plans for alternate or secondary 
communication plans can be put in place. The same considerations can be accounted for 
in the event of adversarial interference. 
The key is building the knowledge and training to the skill sets that will make 
recognition, characterization, and resolution as fast as possible so interference has as little 
of a negative impact on operations as possible.  
Captain Christopher S. Tsirlis highlighted a few more examples of TTPs that 
could be implemented to mitigate negative impacts to SATCOM degradation in an article 
outlining his view that the Marine Corps is over reliant on SATCOM [35]. He endorsed 
staging data sources as far forward in the battlespace as possible to minimize the need for 
SATCOM to access the data and leveraging unmanned aircraft or airships with radio 
relay capabilities to extend the range of terrestrial communications wherever possible. He 
also proposed increased use of tropospheric communication systems, like the TRC-170.    
 
 
                                                 
1For more information on the JSIR process, see Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution Procedures, 
CJCSM 3320.02D, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC, 2013. 
 35 
B. PNT 
The DOD PNT system, GPS, is based on a constellation of satellites that provide 
global, continuous, all weather access to signals that provide highly accurate time data 
which are used for synchronization and to calculate a distance reference to the 
transmitting satellite. When signals from multiple satellites are combined at a receiver, 
position and velocity vectors can be calculated to a great degree of accuracy. Because the 
satellites simply transmit the time-synchronized signal, there can be an unlimited number 
of users; anyone with an operable receiver has access to the signals.  
In order to calculate the basic distance between a receiver and a satellite, the 
receiver will set an identical pseudo-random noise (PRN) code to that of the satellite 
upon reception of a signal. The receiver will then compare the continuous reception of 
this code from the satellite to its own generated code. The difference in timing between 
these codes will directly correspond to the delay resulting from the time required for the 
signal to travel from the satellite to the receiver, and thereby the receiver can calculate the 
range from the satellite to the receiver. The timing must be precise as clock errors result 
in range and position errors. Signals from multiple satellites can be mensurated to quad-
angulate the location and altitude of the receiver.  
 GPS Constellation and Infrastructure 1.
The operational construct provides for 24 satellites in 6 orbital planes, 4 satellites 
per plane. The orbits are in a 55 degree inclined orbit at approximately 12,550 miles of 
altitude. This orbital altitude results in a 12-hour, or semi-synchronous, orbital period. 
This system of satellites provides continuous access to at least 4 satellites anywhere on 
Earth. There are five monitoring stations dispersed around the world that collect 
measurements from satellites in view which are sent to the master control station in 
Colorado Springs, CO, in order to monitor the system accuracy. There are also five 
separate ground antennas around the world that provide the link for telemetry reception 
and satellite command. These antennas are remotely controlled by the master control 
station.  
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 GPS Signals 2.
Two available signals are transmitted from the GPS satellites. There is a Precise 
Positioning Service (PPS) that authorized users have access to that requires the ability to 
receive a precision code (P-code) signal. Users must have the associated cryptologic 
hardware and software to decode an encrypted P-code, which also known as a Y-code or 
P(Y)-code. Users not authorized to use the PPS have access to the Standard Positioning 
Service (SPS) which is available to all coarse/acquisition (C/A) receivers and is intended 
for peaceful, civil, commercial, and scientific use [36]. 
 
Table 3.   Accuracy of GPS Services, from [37]. 
Of note, acquisition of the C/A-code requires relatively high SNR as compared to 
that required to track a P(Y)-code. This is significant particularly in a jamming 
environment. If the C/A-code has been acquired, permitting acquisition of the P(Y)-code, 
then a receiver will be able to maintain lock and access to the GPS signals in the presence 
of GPS jamming that would block acquisition of the signals.  
At one point there was a process available to intentionally degrade the civil GPS 
clock and ephemeris signal. This degradation capability was called selective availability 
(SA). Originally it was intended to deny full GPS accuracy for public use; however, 
President Bill Clinton ordered the discontinuation of SA on 1 May 2000, opening the ten 
times more accurate signal available for public use [38]. While the United States retains 
the capability to activate SA on legacy satellites, the Block III GPS satellites do not have 
the ability to implement SA [39]. 
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Another feature that has been added to the GPS satellites is the Military code or 
M-Code. This is a signal designed to improve the anti-jam capability and secure access 
by authorized military users. Whereas previously military receiver had to acquire and 
lock onto the C/A-code in order to be able to lock on to the P(Y)-code, the M-code is 
designed for autonomous acquisition, meaning a receiver does not have to have access to 
the C/A or P(Y) codes in order to acquire a navigation signal [40]. 
 NAVWAR and PNT Planning Considerations 3.
Navigation warfare (NAVWAR) involves protecting friendly use of PNT 
capabilities, primarily GPS, and preventing hostile use of GPS or other PNT systems, all 
the while trying to minimally impact civil use outside the area of conflict. The lead 
organization in the U.S. military involved in NAVWAR is the Joint Navigation Warfare 
Center (JNWC). The JNWC is under Strategic Command’s Joint Functional Component 
Command for Space and is dedicated to enabling PNT superiority to the DOD, combatant 
commanders, and joint force commanders. The JNWC offers subject matter expertise in 
planning and conducting NAVWAR operations across the spectrum of conflict and in 
operational applications and implications. This expertise comes in the form of around the 
clock availability as well as in deployable teams that can be formed to meet specific 
operational needs of a requesting command.  
There are a number of products that can be of particular use in planning for 
operational NAVWAR considerations. Some of these products can be JNWC-produced 
or staffs and operators can be trained to develop them independently given access to the 
proper resources. One of these products involves determining user range error (URE), 
aggregate errors associated with the satellite clocks, receiver clocks, atmospheric 
interference, orbital geometry, and environmental conditions that lead to multipath signal 
errors. URE graphs, in addition to graphs of local position dilution of precision (PDOP), 
which is a function of the URE and satellite geometry with respect to a receiver, can 
provide an idea of the accuracy and precision of GPS signals that can be expected in a 
geographic location during a specified period of time. These forecasts provide the ability 
for the appropriate commander, staff, or operator to determine if the expected level of 
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GPS accuracy and precision meet the minimum criteria that will be required to 
successfully execute an operation, or if modifications or alternate plans need to be 
developed to mitigate less than optimal GPS performance. These estimates and forecasts 
can be developed for standard conditions or they can be modeled to include hostile 
jamming or other interference. 
Another product or tool available that incorporates URE and PDOP predictions, 
among many others, is the GPS Interference and Navigation Tool (GIANT). GIANT 
plots are mission-level performance and effectiveness simulations that model GPS signal 
accuracy and effectiveness. In addition to URE and PDOP, GIANT can model a jamming 
environment by graphically depicting the effects of a jammer of a specified power in a 
specified location. This allows for comparing jamming effectiveness against various 
weapon systems and platforms, where a C/A signal can be acquired and handed off to a 
P(Y) signal to track before being adversely affected, as well as route planning to mitigate 
jamming effectiveness [41].    
Another capability that can be exploited involves SIGINT detection of GPS 
jamming signals. Staffs can request data on historical trends of the activity, character, and 
type of potential jamming signals that have been detected in a particular area and how 
that activity may or may not have changed recently. Consideration can also be given to 
requesting additional or more focused and robust collection of GPS jamming signals in a 
particular area of operation or in the vicinity of priority targets. The next critical step to 
this would be to ensure that lines of communication are established to be able to funnel 
SIGINT collects to the operators who will be able to use that information and implement 
it to adjust plans as necessary.  
 DOD PNT Use 4.
During Operation Desert Storm, less than 8 percent of air-delivered munitions 
were precision guided, none of which were GPS-guided. Fast forward to Operations Iraqi 
Freedom and Enduring freedom where the majority of the 70 percent of air-delivered 
munitions that were precision guided were GPS-guided [42]. 
 39 
In addition to precision munitions, the Marine Corps uses PNT systems for 
navigation, ranging and targeting systems for fire support, as well as synchronization of 
cryptographic systems and communications networks. GPS is also used on board 
satellites to obtain accurate orbital data and to control spacecraft orientation. There are 
few systems in the DOD inventory that are not either primarily or secondarily enabled by 
GPS.  
 Mitigating Threats to PNT 5.
As with SATCOM interference, a thorough examination of the range of 
degradation and denial mitigation capabilities and considerations is beyond the scope of 
this study. However, there are a number of general considerations that can form a basis 
upon which training programs and evolutions can be developed to build the necessary 
skill sets to most effectively mitigate interference with PNT capabilities on the 
battlefield. 
From GPS navigation and tracking to communication synchronization, PNT 
signals are used at every level of command right down to the rifleman on patrol. 
Similar to SATCOM interference, the ability to recognize the indications of 
jamming or spoofing is a critical skill to develop. It may not be as simple as recognizing 
the loss of the ability to acquire or track the signal. In navigation, understanding the need 
to seek out key features along a route and proactively tracking your actual position 
relative to your intended course is a critical practice. Enough cannot be said about the 
importance of thorough pre-mission route studies and maintaining the perishable skills of 
working with a map and compass. 
In order to compute navigational data from a GPS signal, the receiver must first 
acquire the signal and then be able to maintain lock and track the signal along the relative 
motion between the satellite and receiver. In general, it is more difficult to acquire a 
signal than it is to track the signal. From the perspective of a jammer, it is much easier to 
prevent a receiver from acquiring a signal than it is to prevent the receiver from tracking 
the signal. It often takes much more power to jam an acquired signal. With an 
understanding of these effects and with appropriate technology and planning 
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considerations in place, operators can significantly mitigate negative impacts that 
jammers can have on an operation.  
In addition to navigational considerations, another important consideration that 
must be planned for prior to mission execution is the implications of degradation to the 
accuracy of GPS guided munitions. For example, there can often be a required level of 
accuracy mandated for a desired certainty of effects on a target or there may be direction 
as to the level of acceptable collateral damage. If a primarily-GPS guided munition’s 
accuracy is degraded below that level, either more warheads could be used to ensure 
desired effects, alternate guidance means or alternate weapons systems could be paired 
with the target, or the strike could be called off altogether. These contingencies and rules 
of engagement should be established beforehand to the maximum extent possible and 
clear chains of communication should be established and exercised in the event of 
unforeseen circumstances. At absolute least, Marines employing GPS-centric munitions 
should be able to recognize these effects, understand the implications, and train to the 
requisite TTPs to mitigate the negative impacts. 
Implications of PNT signal interference to communications must also be 
understood and accounted for. The precise timing signal provided by GPS, with accuracy 
on the order of nanoseconds, is integrated into terrestrial and celestial voice and data 
networks and is a fundamental component of frequency modulation schemes and 
numerous encryption regimes. Communicators must be educated on the extent to which 
their systems integrate and rely on GPS timing. The training should also include how to 
distinguish between system malfunctions and hostile interference as well as mitigation 
strategies like alternate means of synchronization and other TTPs to restore 
communications links. 
Another fundamental training point that GPS users must understand is the 
difference between the civil and military signals from GPS satellites. This would mainly 
be focused at ground troops who might find a personal GPS receiver more convenient or 
easier to use than a military issued system. It is important to know that although 
seemingly convenient, the civil signal is much more vulnerable to interference, especially 
in the face of offensive interference in a conflict. This may work well in peacetime, but 
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low-power GPS jamming systems are very inexpensive and easy to acquire or build with 
off the shelf parts. A better understanding of the implications of civil vs military GPS 
receivers would help operators make better decisions about what systems to train with 
and use. 
There are a number of products and tools that are available to planners that model 
PNT capabilities and limitations as they apply to specific scenarios. Staffs and 
commanders should be informed of these tools and learn how the products can benefit the 
planning process. Some of these products include location- and time period-specific 
analysis of URE and PDOP for a target or operational area. This information can offer 
valuable insight as to the strength and accuracy of GPS signals at the place and time of a 
strike which in turn permits more effective planning for target pairing to produce 
maximum desired effects or to minimize collateral damage.  
Another valuable planning tool is the GPS Interference and Navigation Tool 
(GIANT). This is a modeling tool that provides visual and statistical representations of 
jamming environments and navigation system performance, and can be used to analyze 
mission impacts. It can be used to model virtually any known jammer and jamming 
environment and provides intelligence analysts and operational planners a method to pair 
weapon systems to targets, mold routing plans, and shape plans to maximize the benefits 
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VI. MITIGATION EDUCATION AND TRAINING 
In order to take advantage of technology and TTPs that mitigate the effects of 
contested space capabilities, planners and operators must be educated on the threats and 
mitigation capabilities and be trained to practically employ them. This education and 
training must include the nature and character of the threats, how to recognize offensive 
interference and distinguish it from other forms of degradation, understanding and 
employing mitigation steps, as well as reporting chains and restoration processes. The 
education must be applied to the planning process and integrated into operational plans. 
Concurrent to this process, the training must be practically applied and exercised to build 
skill sets and evaluate the effectiveness of the training and the capabilities of the 
operators. 
A. CHALLENGES TO DEGRADED SPACE IN EXERCISES 
There can be significant challenges with inserting space-related injects into a 
training scenario or exercise. Due to the often critically-enabling nature of many space-
based capabilities, if not managed correctly, their loss or degradation in an exercise 
environment can hinder subsequent training objectives. Implications must be considered, 
planned for, and optimized during planning conferences in order to provide for the best 
possible space-related training while still maximizing the most effective training to 
support the overarching exercise objectives. One method to ensure space-related 
degradation does not hinder a higher-level integrated exercise would be to arrange space-
specific lower-level events to exercise mitigation TTPs prior to the larger exercise. 
B. LEVELS WHERE TRAINING IS NEEDED 
As previously stated, education and training are fundamental to developing the 
TTPs and skills that are necessary to operate in a contested space environment. This 
training and education must take place at all levels, from the MOS trained space 
professionals all the way to the junior riflemen navigating with a GPS, but the training 
must, of course, be applicable to the level of involvement with space-related capabilities. 
Each level has mission specific considerations that can be highlighted and mitigation 
 44 
TTPs that can be trained to and implemented. The general levels at which this training 
and education should be addressed and implemented can be divided into three categories: 
first, the MOS-trained space cadre in the Marine Corps; second, MAGTF commanders, 
staffs, and planners; and third, the tactical operators. 
In order to be effective, the training scenario has to lead the operator, staff, or 
commander to make a decision. These decision points are what forces the trainees to 
practically exercise and apply knowledge and develop the necessary and relevant skills so 
they can be applied operationally when the need arises. Whether the training is space 
specific or an inject into a larger more complex evolution, decisions need to be made so 
that consequences can be realized. The consequences and implications of the decisions 
are where the trainees are able to gain the experience and learn the effectiveness of 
certain courses of action. 
 Space Professionals 1.
These Space Professionals are the military occupational specialty (MOS)-trained 
8866s, Space Operations Officers, and 0540s, Space Operations Staff Officers. 8866 
Space Operations Officers represent the Marine Corps’ interests in all space related 
matters where the Marine Corps has a stake including, but not limited to, plans policies, 
doctrine, and requirements [44]. 0540 Space Operations Staff Officers are also tasked 
with making recommendations and participating in planning for space considerations 
[45]; however this MOS is assigned not as a primary MOS (PMOS), but, when earned, is 
meant to supplement a billet holder’s knowledge and expertise in matters where their 
PMOS and space-related operations overlap. These 8866 and 0540 Marines are primary 
stakeholders in integration of space into Marine Corps plans and operations. As primary 
stakeholders, they must know and understand threats to space capabilities and understand 
operational implications and be versed in mitigation strategies and capabilities in order to 
be able to ensure the most up-to-date information, technology, and techniques are made 
available to every level from MAGTF commanders and staffs to the tactical warfighter. 
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 MAGTF Commanders and Staff  2.
The next critical level where training and education on the implications of 
degraded or denied space capabilities must be implemented is at the MAGTF staff level. 
This includes staffs from the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) down to the Marine 
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) and Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), as well as to 
Special Purpose MAGTFs (SPMAGTFs) where these considerations are applicable. 
Implications of degradation or denial of space capabilities primarily impact the staff 
billets relating to Intelligence (J/G/S-2), Operations (J/G/S-3), Plans (J/G-5), and 
Communications (J/G/S-6).  
a. Intelligence 
Commanders and staffs must be able to understand the enemy counter-space 
capabilities and the implications to operations. Much of this knowledge and analysis 
should come from the intelligence section. They are the seekers and purveyors of 
background information and should have the most up-to-date material available on 
threats and capabilities that the rest of the staff can draw from. 
Intelligence staff members must understand the impact degradation of SATCOM 
links will have on the ability to receive and disseminate intelligence products. This 
includes imagery, briefs, manuals, intel updates, and every assortment of voice and data 
transmissions both from higher commands or aboard a ship as well as the ability to push 
information to operators in need in a timely manner. If a link is degraded, considerations 
must be made for how much data can flow and the level of fidelity and resolution of 
intelligence products that can be transmitted in a given period of time if bandwidth is 
reduced. 
Although the Marine Corps intelligence community will not directly take actions 
to mitigate threats to national and strategic collection assets, they must understand the 
impact of possibly not having access to products of these systems in the event they are 
denied by an adversary. This may even include leveraging commercial capabilities.  
 46 
b. Operations 
The Operations Department runs the day-to-day fight and trains and prepares for 
tomorrow’s fight. With the assistance of the intelligence section, they should not only be 
aware of threats and capabilities, but also have prepared and be trained and ready to 
execute applicable TTPs to operate through, mitigate, and overcome to the extent 
possible effects of enemy counter-space operations. They must also ensure the training 
and TTPs are promulgated and coordinated throughout the lower echelons of command. 
Operations staff members should understand the implications of degradation or 
loss of PNT signals to PGMs and have plans and accommodations in place for additional 
warheads, alternate means of guidance, or cancelation of strikes for collateral damage 
considerations. Plans for alternate means of navigation and direction of forces as well as 
tracking of friendly units should also be accounted for.  
They must also have alternate or secondary communication plans in place in the 
event primary channels are rendered incapable of transmitting required level of voice and 
data traffic. This will include ensuring lines of communication linking tactical theater 
ballistic missile warning assets to operational headquarters are in place and continuously 
operable. 
c. Plans 
In order to set the Operations Department up for success, the maximum amount of 
effort should go into the long term planning efforts of the plans divisions of MAGTF 
staffs with regard to understanding the nature of, planning for, and being postured to 
mitigate the effects of enemy counter-space capabilities. Understanding and accounting 
for both enemy and friendly capabilities and limitations will pay immense dividends 
when the time comes to execute an operation in the face of a counter-space equipped 
adversary. These planning considerations should go into every level of conflict, from 
low-intensity conflict with terrorists to full-scale war with a near-peer adversary as the 
technology and capabilities have proliferated to the extent that they are available to some 
extent to virtually anyone.  
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d. Communications 
The communications staff is uniquely capable of being poised to have the greatest 
effect on mitigating the effects of degradation or denial with regard to communications 
systems. These will be the subject matter experts (SMEs) in recognition, mitigation, and 
resolution of SATCOM interference. In the event of interference, communicators must be 
ready to rapidly execute the alternate communication plans as they concurrently attempt 
to characterize and resolve the interference. They must also activate the requisite 
reporting chains (utilizing the JSIR, for example) which will aid in further 
characterization, possible geolocation and resolution of the interference using assets not 
organic to the MAGTF. 
 Tactical Operators  3.
The effects of adversarial counter-space operations will likely be first encountered 
by Marines operating at the point of friction in the tactical environment. These operators 
must be trained to recognize indications of interference and be ready to execute alternate 
courses of action or mitigation TTPs. This includes the units and individually or group-
assigned SMEs operating subordinately to the above mentioned staff positions all the way 
down to the rifleman. In order to accomplish the required proficiency, applicable space-
related education and training must be integrated into MOS schools, unit training, 
Training and Readiness (T&R) manuals, and exercises. “Applicable” should be 
emphasized, as not all levels of operators will require the same depth of training or 
education, but all levels will require training and education to some extent.  
One important point that all Marines dealing with space-related capabilities need 
to be made aware of is the difference between military and civil GPS receivers. All 
Marines at the tactical level will at one point or another use GPS. Military receivers are 
designed to receive and decrypt the P(Y)-code making them more robust and accurate 
once acquired than the C/A-code-only civil receivers. The difference will be even more 
significant as the M-code capability becomes more proliferated. Civilian receivers have 
often been independently procured by individuals or units to augment issued military gear 
in the face of hard to use or unavailable military-issue equipment. While they can be a 
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valuable tool, Marines have to understand the limitations and constraints of civil 
receivers and the vulnerabilities in the face of interference. The Marines need to have 
access to and be proficient at using military receivers requisite with their missions, even 
if harder to use or interface with than a similar civilian receiver. If Marines do not train 
with military receivers, they will not become proficient. The optimal solution would be to 
ensure military receivers are as user-friendly as possible and are available to every 
operator who could use one if it would enhance their ability to execute an assigned 
mission set, thus eliminating the temptation to use or seek out civilian receivers.  
The next area that effective training would be advantageous is that of SATCOM 
considerations to every level of communications Marines as well as users who may not 
be MOS-trained communicators. Even a moderate level of background and education on 
jamming and interference threats and some basic mitigation principles would pay 
significant dividends in the event that they face adversarial interference.  
With respect to intelligence Marines assigned to ground combat element (GCE) 
and aviation combat element (ACE) components of a MAGTF, similar considerations 
should be taken into account regarding understanding adversarial space and counter-
space capabilities that could have relevant impacts on their unit’s mission. Furthermore, 
intelligence Marines should have a clear understanding of how the intelligence products 
they pull from higher echelons and the products they generate are disseminated and how 
degraded or denied space-based lines of communication will affect that flow.  
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VII. MARINE CORPS TRAINING VENUES  
A. NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
The majority of Marine Corps MOS 8866 Space Operations Officers are educated 
at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The two-year Space Systems 
Operations curriculum includes courses in military applications of space, military satellite 
communications, space control, space systems and operations, and numerous other in-
depth space-related courses of study. 
This education provides the foundation for the most robust understanding of the 
implications of space capabilities to Marine Corps operations at the strategic, operational, 
and tactical levels. This provides the opportunity for 8866s to become the most broadly 
educated and well versed Marines in matters of threats to space systems and capabilities, 
implications to combat operations, and mitigation considerations and strategies. 
B. NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE INSTITUTE 
The National Security Space Institute (NSSI) is an Air Force Space Command 
school which provides Department of Defense space professionals with continuing 
education in pursuit of the Space Professional Development Program and offers two main 
courses: Space 200 and Space 300 [46]. 
Space 200 is advertised as a mid-career course for space professional education. 
The course focuses on Space Systems Development and Space Power. The most pertinent 
objectives that graduates will be able to bring to the fight are an increased understanding 
of the impact of space mission areas across the range of military operations and the 
ability to analyze the impact of competitive space and counter-space capabilities 
involving joint and coalition forces [46]. This course is a qualifying course for MOS 
0540, Space Operations Staff Officers, and would be of value to intelligence and 
communications staff officers, for example, to better understand the space considerations 
to their domains. 
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Space 300 is considered a capstone course for space professional education. This 
course addresses more strategic and operational considerations involving space 
capabilities. This course covers such topics as space policy and strategy implications to 
national security, ways to effectively advocate for space capabilities, and effective 
employment of space capabilities in support of operational and strategic objectives, 
among others [46]. This course would be of benefit to staff-level space operations 
officers and provides a broader understanding of space implications and counter-space 
mitigation considerations, capabilities, and strategies that they could bring back to their 
fellow staff members and commanders. 
C. ADVANCED SPACE OPERATIONS SCHOOL 
As a part of Headquarters Air Force Space Command, Air, Space, and 
Cyberspace Operations (A3), Advanced Space Operations School (ASOpS) provides in-
depth courses on space systems, capabilities, requirements, acquisition, strategies and 
policies in support of joint military operations and national security. ASOpS offers a wide 
range of education and training courses scoped for all levels from tactical operations to 
executive space leadership. Of particular note in matters relating to the considerations of 
degraded or denied space-enabled capabilities, two particular courses are particularly 
applicable: the Navigation Operations (NAVOPS) Advanced Course and the SATCOM 
Advanced Course [47].  
The NAVOPS Advanced Course is a three-week, application-level course 
designed to provide an in-depth understanding of the GPS construct and it provides 
education and training in matters related to NAVOPS and NAVWAR applications, 
capabilities, threats and countermeasures [47]. This would be a beneficial course for 
various MAGTF staff members as well as individuals that might be tasked with 
instructing NAVWAR-related subjects in education portions of training commands and 
operational exercises. Although more in-depth than most tactical operators will need, 
staff members will be able to integrate the knowledge in to operational plans and 
execution and instructors will be able to craft the learning points to be most applicable to 
an audience. 
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The 3-week SATCOM Advanced Course provides space and communications 
professionals with in-depth understanding of SATCOM systems, covering development, 
acquisition, employment, and sustainment. The course also covers application and 
employment of SATCOM systems as well as capabilities, limitations, vulnerabilities and 
effects [47]. This course of study is most applicable to experienced communication 
officers and MAGTF communications staff members, in general. 
D. COMMUNICATIONS SCHOOLS 
Marine Corps Communication-Electronics Schools are the foundational schools 
for training and educating all communications, maintenance, and aviation command and 
control and defense Marines with the expressed goal of ensuring commanders and 
operators have access to critical information when and where they want it [48]. 
Considering the level to which the Marine Corps relies on SATCOM, communication 
Marines need robust training in threats to SATCOM capabilities as well as interference 
recognition, characterization, and resident mitigation strategies and capabilities. 
Furthermore, training involving reporting chains and procedures are important for 
communicators to understand strategic characterization, mitigation, and resolution 
capabilities that can be made available to a MAGTF operation. 
E. INTELLIGENCE SCHOOLS 
Marine Corps intelligence schools ensure Marines are educated and trained to be 
effective intelligence operators in the various MAGTF intelligence fields [49]. In addition 
to training on space-related intelligence capabilities and considerations, it is important to 
provide instruction on the threats and potential impacts to intelligence-gathering 
capabilities. This includes determining the communication links that are SATCOM 
dependent and the implications to the reception and dissemination of intelligence 
products, as well as implications of the threats to space-based ISR assets, and 
terrestrially-based, SATCOM-dependent ISR assets. It is also important to emphasize the 
implications of other adversarial counter-space capabilities in order for intelligence 
Marines to be aware of the need to include those considerations in collection plans and 
then provide the relevant information to the staffs and commanders they inform. 
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F. MARINE AVIATION WEAPONS AND TRAINING SQUADRON ONE  
Marine Aviation Weapons and Training Squadron One (MAWTS-1), based at 
Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Yuma, Airzona, is the premier training unit for 
advanced tactical aviation training. MAWTS-1 provides “standardized advanced tactical 
training and certification of unit instructor qualifications that support Marine Aviation 
training and readiness and provides assistance in the development and employment of 
aviation weapons and tactics” [50]. In pursuit of this mission, the squadron hosts the 
Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) Course. Held twice a year, this course trains the 
full spectrum of ACE officers from pilots to aviation intelligence and communication 
Marines in the broad field of Marine Corps aviation as well as MOS specific in-depth 
advanced training with their respective weapon systems and capabilities. After 
graduation, the newly minted WTIs return to their respective units to pass along the 
tactical knowledge and experience. 
The WTI course is somewhat of a mix of academic training and tactical exercises. 
The first three weeks of the WTI course involves intensive classroom instruction and 
examinations on the overall perspective of Marine Corps aviation capabilities. This 
would provide a perfect environment to introduce applicable space-related tactical 
considerations. This could include an introduction to threats to PNT and SATCOM and 
mitigation strategies they can incorporate at their level. In the subsequent in-flight 
segment of the course, integrating requisite injects which cause the student to face 
decision points which force them to draw on the mitigation knowledge and back-up plans 
would help the students understand the relevance of the threats and afford them the 
opportunity to internalize the training. 
G. MARINE CORPS TACTICS AND OPERATIONS GROUP  
Based at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC), Twentynine 
Palms, California, Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group (MCTOG) provides 
advanced and standardized training in MAGTF operations, combined arms training, and 
battalion and regimental level unit readiness planning [51]. In addition, MCTOG helps 
standardize doctrine and training standards in order to enhance pre-deployment training 
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and general proficiency of MAGTF GCE units. While MATWS-1 generally focuses on 
the ACE and on training individuals in a group atmosphere, MCTOG facilitates GCE 
training of whole units and senior command elements to specifically operate together 
[51].  
While there are standardized large exercises, MCTOG can craft each exercise to 
fit the specific needs of the unit in training. The MCTOG is postured to provide 
everything from classroom instruction on planning and operations to large formation 
combined arms live-fire exercises. There are numerous venues in which appropriately 
scoped and valuable space degradation and mitigation training could be easily integrated 
into training evolutions at almost every level of command.  
The U.S. Army has a similar training venue in the National Training Center 
(NTC) at Fort Irwin, California. In order to facilitate and integrate space related 
considerations and injects into training exercises across the spectrum of operations, the 
Army has assigned an FA40, the MOS-designation for a Space Professional, to the 
Operations Group at the NTC [52]. The FA40 will bring in-depth space-related 
knowledge and experience to curriculum and exercise planning to add fidelity and 
relevance to the soldiers’ training at the NTC.  
H. MAGTF STAFF TRAINING PROGRAM 
The MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP) in Quantico, Virginia focuses on 
training senior commanders and their staffs by developing a common understanding of 
MAGTF doctrine and operations across the range of military operations in order to 
enhance the capabilities to employ a MEB or MEF in Joint and Combined Task Force 
environments [53]. This provides an ideal forum to inform, educate, and train senior 
leaders on the implications of degradation or denial of critical space-enabled capabilities 
and introduce mitigation strategies and capabilities in order for them to be able to apply 
that knowledge in planning and command.  
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I. MEF EXERCISES 
The Marine Corps continuously conducts MEF-level exercises around the world 
to develop and exercise operational plans and increase warfighter proficiency. This is 
another critical venue in which space capabilities and implications of degradation can be 
observed, experienced, and evaluated. Simulations must be injected into the scenarios 
that allow operational commanders and their staffs to develop and exercise TTPs that will 
allow them to fully exploit space capabilities, observe effects of degraded space 
capabilities, and then mitigate the effects to the point that the operation can continue and 
the mission can be accomplished. The optimal goal would be to integrate live, realistic 
scenarios into the conduct of these exercises without sacrificing other training objectives 
that are otherwise heavily reliant on space-enabled capabilities.  
These are the perfect events to showcase the capabilities of the 8866 Space 
Operations Officer on the MEF staff. This officer can leverage other services, external 
agencies, and other resources to build scenarios that will exercise the spectrum of 
capabilities and offer the ability for Marines at every applicable level to experience 
effects and implement mitigation strategies.  
J. OTHER SOURCES OF INSTRUCTION AND TRAINING  
Whether in support of the units and venues addressed above or in support of 
another unit seeking any level of relevant education or training on how degraded or 
denied space will operationally impact their mission, there are a number of other offices, 
units, agencies, and other resources that can be leveraged to provide a full spectrum of 
support to exercises and operations. These organizations and individuals can provide 
highly valuable and relevant education and training across the spectrum of threats and 
operations and can be leveraged to support exercises and training programs and may even 
be individually requested by operational units if there is availability.   
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 Marine Corps Subject Matter Experts 1.
8866 Space Operations Officers and 0540 Space Operations Staff Officer are 
spread throughout the Marine Corps in various staff and operational billets. With in-depth 
training and experience from above mentioned educational and training programs, they 
will often be the conduit through which that training is promulgated or facilitated to 
operators across the Marine Corps.  
Information Operations and Space Integration Branch (PLI), a branch of Plans, 
Policies, and Operations (PP&O), Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC), is the lead office 
for all space-related matters for the Marine Corps and coordinates internal and external 
plans and support that affect MAGTF space operations. This office is also where the 
8866 and 0540 Occupational Sponsor resides. These Marines are uniquely well-
positioned to advocate for and facilitate increased opportunities for education, training, 
and support to MAGTF staffs and warfighters involving degradation or denial of space 
capabilities. 
Other entities that are poised to provide support and facilitate more robust training 
opportunities are 8866s billeted at Marine Forces Strategic Command 
(MARFORSTRAT) and Joint Forces Component Command for Space (JFCC-Space). 
These Marines have developed relationships with and have access to points of contact in 
the Joint space arena which they can leverage to not only advocate for Marine Corps 
interests in those areas, but also enhance the Marine Corps’ ability to learn about and 
exploit those capabilities.   
 There should be a simultaneous “push-pull” relationship between Space 
Operations Marines and units, staffs, and operators that will ensure access to up-to-date, 
relevant, and applicable space related considerations that can be used to enhance 
operational capability. Space Operations professionals should push information and 
inspire an understanding of the critical need to train to operate in the face of degraded or 
denied critical space capabilities. As this knowledge and understanding becomes further 
proliferated, units and training venues should be seeking appropriate and relevant training 
opportunities, especially when preparing for deployments or exercises.  
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 U.S. Air Force 527th Space Aggressor Squadron 2.
Aggressor squadrons in the U.S. Air Force are established to provide realistic and 
highly capable opposition to operational forces in training. The 527th Space Aggressor 
Squadron (SAS), and its reserve component sister unit, the 26th SAS, are dedicated to 
providing that capability as it relates to space, cyberspace, intelligence, and RF 
transmission professionals. Their mission is to prepare operators to fight in and through 
contested space environments by knowing, teaching, and replicating realistic and relevant 
space threats [54]. 
In partnership with numerous intelligence organizations, they focus on learning 
about up-to-date adversary systems and tactics and industry capabilities and anticipate 
future threats. They gather information on all threats to space, but they mainly specialize 
in electronic warfare capabilities. They take this knowledge and provide it to warfighters 
spanning a wide range of training audiences from aircrew and infantry to communication 
specialists, satellite operators, and even senior leadership. They can aid in exercise 
development and execution and play an active part in debriefing processes during and 
after events or exercises. In addition to academic and planning assistance, the 527th can 
replicate various threat systems and capabilities in live-training scenarios to varying 
degrees. This includes GPS jamming and commercial and military SATCOM link 
jamming, as well as the ability to replicate adversary SATCOM links and nodes [54]. 
Although highly proficient, the 527th and 26th are relatively small units and are in 
high demand. They are significantly constrained by manpower and resource availability 
despite the high demand for support to everything from tactical, operational, and strategic 
exercises to operational tests and evaluations as well providing academic support to a 
number of joint education commands. This unit and its capabilities would be very 
valuable to leverage in many levels of MAGTF training as long as coordination could be 
made and resources made available to exploit those capabilities.  
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 Army Space Support Team 3.
The Army Space Support Team (ARSST) construct is designed to provide a team 
of trained space professionals that can facilitate access to Army, joint, and national space 
capabilities for an operational headquarters. The teams are detached from the Army’s 1st 
Space Brigade and attached to supported units; more than 70 teams have deployed to 
Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001. Teams have also deployed to numerous other sites 
around the world as well as within the United States where they provided satellite 
imagery and satellite communications support to civil authorities in support of disaster 
relief and consequence management operations [55]. 
The ARSST is designed to support operational commands and in order for them 
to be most proficient in doing so and for supported commands to be able to best integrate 
their robust capabilities into their battle rhythm, ARSSTs also deploy in support of 
operational exercises. The capability integration and command relationship development 
are a function of exercising this asset which can be made available to an appropriately 
scoped MAGTF. However, this capability must be planned for and support requests 
should be submitted as early as possible in the exercise planning process to ensure the 
assets and services they provide can be most effectively exploited.  
 Other Valuable Resources 4.
There a significant number of other SMEs, agencies and other entities with 
valuable insight into threats to space capabilities and mitigation strategies and 
capabilities. Some examples include the JNWC, the National Reconnaissance Office 
(NRO), Navy Network Warfare Command (NNWC), National Air and Space Intelligence 
Center (NASIC), and the Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC), to name a few. 
These agencies can provide MTTs or can be reached by VTC or other means to provide 
in-depth and mission-specific training and education.  
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VIII. THE STATE OF TRAINING AND EDUCATION  
A. MEF EXERCISES 
As previously mentioned, MEF exercises are critical venues in which space 
related interference can be integrated which will enable commanders, staffs, and watch 
officers to exercise tactical and operational mitigation principles and strategies. A recent 
series of exercises which III MEF has participated in is an excellent example where this 
type integration has begun. III MEF, headquartered in Okinawa, Japan, participates in 
two major annual exercises, in coordination with Joint forces and the South Korean 
military, to exercise plans involving operations on the Korean peninsula, Exercise Key 
Resolve and Exercise Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG). A crawl-walk-run progression 
was adopted for implementing space-related injects into the III MEF play in the exercises 
and was primarily driven by the III MEF Space Operations Officer [56].  
In Key Resolve 2014 [56], the MEF staff officer coordinated with the white cell 
to inject a limited number of SATCOM and GPS jamming reports as the scenario 
progressed. These notional interference reports were intended to exercise reporting chains 
within the MEF and triggered simulated reports that were then submitted to the white 
cell. A member of the white cell, with whom the coordination had primarily been made, 
had previous space experience and could verify the actions were in line with what was 
expected [54]. 
Prior to UFG in August of 2014, III MEF reached out to the Director of Space 
Forces (DS4), the organization responsible for space operations for the Joint Forces, to 
coordinate a more robust space involvement in III MEF operations as the scenario played 
out. In addition to the DS4 cell providing more robust space-related products for the MEF 
staff’s planning, the DS4 provided interference injects, as the MEF white cell had done in 
Key Resolve 2014. This provided for more involved and higher fidelity injects as well as 
the exercising of external reporting chains. This also helped build a better understanding 
of capabilities and limitations among the units and established a stronger relationship 
between MEF and Joint space entities [56].  
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In Key Resolve 2015 [56], even more fidelity was added to the play of space in 
the MEF’s conduct of the exercise. Instead of the Space Operations officer being the sole 
main player in dealing with space interference and other space effects, a space operations 
Marine was posted at the DS4 to help coordinate between the MEF and the DS4 and the 
interference injects were actually elevated to the Fires and Effects Coordination Cell 
(FECC). The FECC was then able to make decisions and take actions to mitigate 
interference based on the information. For example, there was forecasted space weather 
that was projected to degrade communication capabilities; the decision was made to 
employ an additional C-130 to serve as a radio relay back-up to a primary communication 
plan. Additionally, when notional GPS jamming was reported, actions were taken to 
mitigate the jammer [56].  
As this progression shows, there has been significant progress at III MEF in the 
arena of accounting for degradation or denial of space capabilities. Overall fidelity and 
effectiveness could be improved by integrating space considerations more fully in 
planning conferences as well as in debriefs. This is scheduled to occur for UFG 2015 [56] 
and will prove invaluable for all parties involved.  
B. COMMUNICATIONS SCHOOL 
There have been a number of significant advances in educating Marines with 
respect to SATCOM degradation and denial. The communications schools, directed by 
the Communications Training Battalion, is currently re-working the full curriculum for 
the Warrant Officer Communications Course to include a robust curriculum including 
threats and response planning and coordination, with a plan to implement the curriculum 
in July of 2015 [57]. The Appendix shows the class titles and durations of the pending 
curriculum. As these subjects are integrated into the Warrant Officer Communications 
Course, applicable threat and mitigation education and training will be incrementally 
integrated into other curricula at the communications schoolhouse [57]. 
Other initiatives at the Marine Corps Communication Training Battalion involve 
seeking out other valuable sources of education and training regarding SATCOM 
degradation and denial. The battalion Operations Officer was able to attend the NSSI 
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Advanced SATCOM course and suggested there are a number of key billet-holders that 
would benefit from taking the course [58]. This is an example of further outreach by the 
schoolhouse to expand the quality and quantity of applicable contested space training.  
C. MAWTS-1 
A majority of the scenarios in the WTI course have a GPS jammer briefed to the 
pilots by Intelligence Marines in pre-flight briefs and instructors will often secure a 
student’s GPS in flight to simulate a GPS outage. Students are also forced to account for 
GPS denial in weaponeering their flights and in ground exercises [59]. While this is 
relatively low fidelity, considerations are being made to integrate more live, realistic 
effects into more domains of the course and increase their fidelity. MAWTS-1 has been 
engaging the NRO for classes to intelligence WTI students and other external agencies 
for academic training points [60], [61]; this and additional steps such as engaging in 
space related tactical demonstrations (TACDEMOs) [62], requesting support from the 
527th SAS [54], [63], and other cooperative activities with external entities, demonstrate 
they are actively seeking an expanded integration of relevant training points involving 
operation in and through degraded or denied space.  
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IX. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EXPANDING 
IMPLEMENTATION 
While there are positive indications that education and training to operate in a 
degraded or denied space environment are expanding to fill the gap, there is significant 
room and a critical need for further expansion in the breadth and depth of training 
integrated across the spectrum of academic and practical application scenarios. The 
Marine Corps must leverage internal assets, develop and expand schoolhouse education 
and training, integrate contested space more fully in tactical and operational exercises, 
and leverage external assets to enhance each of these initiatives.  
 Leverage Internal Assets (1)
In order to facilitate integration of space degradation and denial into the full range 
of applicable venues, space professionals from PLI, MARFORSTRAT, JFCC-Space, and 
MEF staff Space Operations Officers can provide the initiative to promote and facilitate 
this integration into the day-to-day view of operational units. 0540s and space 
professionals not currently serving in space-specific billets can also provide valuable 
insight and initiative to promote and facilitate more robust training points and 
considerations to their respective commands and operational responsibilities.  
 Expand Schoolhouse and Staff Education and Training (2)
With the assistance and support of the cadre of space professionals, schoolhouse 
education and training should be expanded to include relevant, MOS-specific 
considerations for, implications of, and mitigation strategies for contested space. This 
includes communication and intelligence schools, from initial MOS schools, to advanced 
MOS and professional development schools. These considerations should also be 
included in the MSTP curriculum for commanders and staffs with respect to applying 




 Integrate Training in Tactical and Operational Exercises (3)
In addition to education and initial training venues, these principles should also be 
integrated into tactical and operational exercises across the spectrum of MAGTF 
operations. This includes unit-level training, pre-deployment training, MAWTS-1 WTI 
classes, large unit exercises overseen by the MCTOG, MEF-level exercises, command 
post exercises, and even MEU certification exercises overseen by a Special Operations 
Training Group (SOTG). There is a place in each of these venues for relevant and 
valuable training points to be introduced and/or exercised to every Marine and level of 
command. 
 Leverage External Assets (4)
There are numerous entities external to the Marine Corps that have extraordinary 
capability to enhance the Marine Corps’ training, education, and operational capabilities. 
To varying extents, the Air Force’s 527th SAS, the 1st Space Brigade’s ARSSTs, and a 
vast number of other agency SMEs and MTTs can all provide knowledge, expertise, and 
capabilities otherwise unavailable to the Marine Corps. Although these capabilities may 
be limited at times to varying degrees in funding or availability, rare would be the case 
that every effort would not be made to do everything in their power to support a 
requesting organization to the maximum extent they are able. These organizations 
understand the critical nature of training and education in overcoming obstacles that arise 
due to degraded or denied space-enabled capabilities and are generally highly motivated 
to assist and promulgate information and valuable training points relevant to their 
specialties.   
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APPENDIX.  PENDING CURRICULUM FOR THE WARRANT 
OFFICER COMMUNICATION COURSE 
Day # Hours 
Day 1   
Intro to SATCOM History and Organizations 1 
SATCOM Systems Overview 1 
SATCOM System Environment, Systems, Engineering, and Fundamentals 
Overview 
2 
VSAT Training Orientation 0.45 
Day 2  
Introduction to SATCOM and Space Block 0.3 
Space Organizations and C2 Structures 0.45 
Space Environment 1 
Atmospheric Effects on Received Signals 0.45 
Modulation, FEC and Multiplexing Review 1 
SATCOM Engineering I:  Payloads, Buses and Architectures 1 
SATCOM Engineering II: UHF, SHF and EHF Payloads and Constellations 2 
SATCOM Engineering III: Commercial, Coalition and Joint Payloads and 
Constellations 
1 
Day 3  
SATCOM Planning I:  Intro to SATCOM Planning 1 
SATCOM Planning II: Gateway Ops 1 
SATCOM Planning III: MILSATCOM 1 
SATCOM Planning IV: Joint and NATO Planning 1 
SATCOM Planning V: Link Engineering 1 
SATCOM Planning VI: Link Engineering TDG 1 
 66 
SATCOM Planning VII: SATCOM Product Development 1 
SATCOM Planning VIII: Resource Planning TDG 0.3 
Day 4  
Space and MAGTF Ops Integration 1.5 
Amphibious Networks 1 
NCTAMS Brief or VTC 1 
Joint and Coalition Networks 1 
Joint and Coalition Networks VTC 1 
Introduction to Degraded and Contested Environments: Threats 1 
Transmission Officer Degraded and Contested Ops Considerations 1 
Countermeasures, Anti-jamming, Reporting and Response Coordination 1 
Day 5  
SATCOM Threat Brief 1 
Spectrum-Cyber Threat Brief 1 
Introduction to Response Coordination 1 
Spectrum Reporting and Response Planning 1 
Degraded and Contested Environments Mitigation Management and Planning 1 
Introduction to Space Control 1.5 
Planning in Degraded Environments TDG 2 
Day 6  
Planning in Degraded Environments TDG 2 
Policy Brief 1 
Foreign SATCOM and Space Tools 1 
Future DOD SATCOM 1 
Alternate Space Applications 1 
EOCC 1 
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